The connections between nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision are well-known. A central problem in the area of nonmonotonic reasoning is the problem of default entailment, i.e., when should an item of default information representing "if θ is true then, normally, φ is true" be said to follow from a given set of items of such information. Many answers to this question have been proposed but, surprisingly, virtually none have attempted any explicit connection to belief revision. The aim of this paper is to give an example of how such a connection can be made by showing how the lexicographic closure of a set of defaults may be conceptualised as a process of iterated revision by sets of sentences. Specifically we use the revision method of Nayak.
Introduction and Preliminaries
The methodological connections between the areas of nonmonotonic reasoning, i.e., the process by which an agent may, possibly, withdraw previously derived conclusions upon enlarging her set of hypotheses , and belief revision, i.e., the process by which an agent changes her beliefs upon discovering some new information Gärdenfors 1988) , are well-known (see, for example, (Gärdenfors & Makinson 1994; Gärdenfors & Rott 1995; Rott 1996) ). As a consequence, it is possible to translate particular problems in one area into problems in the other. One particular problem in nonmonotonic reasoning is the question of default entailment, i.e., when should we regard one item of so-called "default knowledge" (hereafter just "default"), i.e., an expression of the form θ ⇒ φ standing for "if θ then normally (or usually, or typically) φ", as "following from" a given set of defaults. Several answers to this question have been proposed in the literature (such as in (Benferhat et al. 1993; Benferhat, Saffiotti, & Smets 1995; Goldszmidt, Morris, & Pearl 1993; Lehmann 1995; Lehmann & Magidor 1992; Pearl 1990; Weydert 1996) , to name but a few) but none of them (with the exception of the last named) seem to attempt any explicit connection with belief revision. The aim of this paper is to make a start on such a connection by showing how one particular method of default entailment, namely the lexicographic closure construction (Benferhat et al. 1993; Lehmann 1995) can be given a formulation in terms of a certain method of belief revision which was first given in (Nayak 1994) and studied further in (Nayak, Nelson, & Polansky 1996) . In the process, we uncover one or two interesting avenues for further research on both sides.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Firstly, in the next section we formally pose the basic question of default entailment outlined above and describe the lexicographic closure. The set of defaults defined by the lexicographic closure, considered as a binary relation, forms a rational consequence relation (in the sense of (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor 1990) ). The section following this introduces the theory of belief revision and the important notion of epistemic entrenchment relation (E-relation for short) which it utilises. Also in this section we describe the correspondence between Erelations and rational consequence relations. Next, with the aid of this correspondence, we describe Nayak's operation of revision. Nayak proposes to model revision of an epistemic state (represented as an E-relation) by an arbitrary set of sentences by first converting this set into an E-relation and then revising by this relation. We present one particular method for generating an E-relation from a set of sentences and show our main result: that, given this method, the E-relation corresponding to the lexicographic closure can be obtained by revising the initial epistemic state (which we take to be the E-relation in which the only sentences believed are the tautologies) firstly by the set of (the material counterparts of) those defaults which are the least specific, then those defaults which are the next-least specific and so on up to the set of the most specific defaults. After this we give our ideas for possible further study before offering some short concluding remarks.
Before we get started, let us fix our notation. Throughout this paper, L is an arbitrary but fixed propositional language built up from a finite set of propositional variables using the usual connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ⊤ and ⊥. Semantics is provided by the (finite) set W of propositional worlds. For θ ∈ L we set S θ = {w ∈ W | w |= θ}, i.e., S θ is the set of worlds which satisfy θ. Given E ∪ {φ} ⊆ L we write E |= φ whenever θ∈E S θ ⊆ S φ and let Cn(E) denote the set {φ | E |= φ}. As usual we write θ |= φ rather than {θ} |= φ etc. while, for any w ∈ W and E ⊆ L we set sent E (w) = {θ ∈ E | w |= θ}. Finally, for an arbitrary set X we use |X| to denote the cardinality of X.
The Lexicographic Closure of a Set of Defaults
Suppose we have somehow learnt that an intelligent agent believes some finite set of defaults
In this case what other assertions of this form should we conclude our agent believes? Or, put another way, what is the binary relation |∼ ∆ on L where θ |∼ ∆ φ holds iff we can conclude, on the basis of ∆, that if θ is true then, normally, φ is also true? In this paper, one answer to this question which we are particularly interested in is the lexicographic closure construction which was proposed independently in both (Benferhat et al. 1993) and (Lehmann 1995) . We describe this construction now.
Throughout this paper we assume that ∆ is an arbitrary but fixed, finite set of defaults. For this paper we also make the simplifying assumption that ∆ is "consistent", in the sense that its set of material counterparts
Using a procedure given in (Pearl 1990) (or, equivalently, in (Lehmann & Magidor 1992) ) we may partition ∆ into ∆ = (∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ n ), where the ∆ i correspond, in a precise sense, to "levels of specificity" -given a default δ ∈ ∆, the larger the i for which δ ∈ ∆ i , the more specific are the situations to which δ is applicable. Following (Pearl 1990 ), we call this partition the Z-partition of ∆. Like many methods of default entailment (see (Benferhat et al. 1993) for several examples), the lexicographic closure can be based on a method of choosing maximal consistent subsets of ∆ → . More precisely the lexicographic closure is a member of a family of consequence relations |∼ ∆ ≪ , where ≪ is an ordering on 2 ∆ , and, for all θ, φ ∈ L, we have θ |∼ ∆ ≪ φ iff for all Γ ⊆ ∆ such that Γ → ∪ {θ} is consistent and Γ is ≪-maximal amongst such subsets, we have Γ → ∪ {θ} |= φ.
To specify the lexicographic closure we instantiate the order ≪ above, with the help of the Z-partition, as follows: Given subsets A, B ⊆ ∆ let A i = A ∩ ∆ i and B i = B∩∆ i for each i = 0, . . . , n. We define an ordering ≪ lex on 2 ∆ by:
A ≪ lex B iff there exists i such that |A i | < |B i | and, for all j > i, |A j | = |B j |.
(The reason for the name "lexicographic closure" should now be clear.) The lexicographic closure |∼ ∆ lex is then just defined to be |∼
How successful is |∼ ∆ lex in achieving the goals of default reasoning? We refer the reader to (Lehmann 1995) for the details. However, the internal, closure properties of |∼ ∆ lex can be summed up by the following proposition, which can be found jointly in (Benferhat et al. 1993) and (Lehmann 1995) .
Proposition 1 The binary relation |∼
∆ lex is a rational consequence relation (see (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor 1990; Lehmann & Magidor 1992) (Freund 1993; Lehmann & Magidor 1992) ) that rational consequence relations may be represented by finite sequences U = (U 0 , . . . , U k ) of mutually disjoint subsets of W in the following sense: Given such a sequence U and θ ∈ L we set rank
no such i exists then we set rank
then |∼ U forms a rational consequence relation, while moreover every rational consequence relation arises in this way from some sequence U.
2 The intuition behind the sequences U is that they represent a "ranking" of the worlds in W according to their plausibility -the lower the i for which w ∈ U i , the more plausible, in relation to the other worlds, it is considered to be. If w ∈ U i for all i then we may take w to be considered "impossible".
One thing to note about the definition of |∼ U given above is that we allow ∅ to appear, possibly more than once, in U.
3 This freedom comes in useful when proving some of our results. It also has the effect that the mapping U →|∼ U detailed above is not injective -given a rational consequence relation |∼ there will be many (in fact infinitely many) sequences U such that |∼=|∼ U .
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Another thing to note about |∼ U is that |∼ U will be consistency preserving iff k i=0 U i = W , while it will 1 Note the first clause includes the case rank U (θ ∧ ¬φ) = ∞ and rank U (θ) = ∞. 2 Such sequences are clearly equivalent to the ranked models used to characterise rational consequence relations in (Lehmann & Magidor 1992) .
3 This approach carries us very close to the "semiquantitative" approaches of (Spohn 1988; Weydert 1996; Williams 1994) , which use an explicit ranking function as a starting point rather than deriving one from a sequence of world-sets. Our approach, though, remains squarely qualitative in character.
4 Since clearly we can insert as many copies of ∅ into the sequence (U0, . . . , U k ) as we wish without changing the relation |∼ U .
be trivial, i.e., will satisfy θ |∼ U φ for all θ and φ, iff k i=0 U i = ∅. We make the following definitions:
We let Υ denote the set of all such U which are either full or empty.
Hence Proposition 1 tells us that there must exist a full sequence U ∈ Υ such that θ |∼ ∆ lex φ iff θ |∼ U φ. What form does U take here? The answer is given in (Benferhat et al. 1993 ) and (Lehmann 1995) (and is, in fact, used to define |∼ ∆ lex in the latter). In this paper we show that we can arrive at this answer via a different route.
Belief Revision and Epistemic Entrenchment
Belief revision is concerned with the following problem: How should an agent revise her beliefs upon receiving some new information which may, possibly, contradict some of her current beliefs? The most popular basic framework within which this question is studied is the one laid down by Alchourŕon, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) in . In that framework an agent's epistemic state is represented as a logically closed set of sentences called a belief set, and the new information, or epistemic input, is represented as a single sentence. AGM propose a number of postulates which a reasonable operation of revision should satisfy. In particular, the revised belief set should contain the epistemic input and should be consistent. 5 In order to meet these requirements, in the general case when the input is inconsistent with the prior belief set, the agent is forced to give up some of her prior beliefs. One way of determining precisely which sentences the agent should give up in this situation is to assign to the agent an E-relation on L (see, for example, (Gärdenfors 1988; Gärdenfors & Makinson 1994; Nayak 1994; Rott 1992a; Rott 1996) ).
The intuitive meaning behind E-relations is that φ ψ should hold iff the agent finds it at least as easy to give up φ as she does ψ, i.e., her belief in ψ is at least as entrenched as her belief in φ. In cases of conflict the agent should then give up those sentences which are less entrenched. In what follows we use ≺ to denote the strict part of , i.e, θ ≺ φ iff θ φ and not(φ θ). We follow (Nayak 1994) in formally defining E-relations as follows:
If there is no ψ ∈ L such that ⊥ ≺ ψ, equivalently, if θ φ holds for all θ, φ, then we call the absurd E-relation. The original definition of E-relation, such as is found in (Gärdenfors 1988) , is given relative to a belief set. However, as is noted in (Nayak 1994), Erelations contain enough information by themselves for the belief set to be extracted from it. The belief set Bel( ) associated with the E-relation is defined as:
The belief set associated with an E-relation was called its epistemic content in (Nayak 1994).
E-relations and Rational Consequence
We now bring in the connection between E-relations, as they have been defined here, and rational consequence relations. The following result is virtually the same as one given in (Gärdenfors & Makinson 1994) .
Proposition 2 Let |∼ be a rational consequence relation which is either consistency preserving or trivial. If we define, from |∼, a binary relation ∼ on L by setting, for all θ, φ ∈ L,
then ∼ forms an E-relation. Conversely if, given an E-relation we define a binary relation |∼ on L by setting, for all θ, φ ∈ L, θ |∼ φ iff ¬θ ≺ ¬θ ∨ φ or ⊤ ¬θ then |∼ forms a rational consequence relation which is either consistency preserving or trivial. Furthermore the identity |∼=|∼ ∼ holds.
So there is a bijection between rational consequence relations which are either consistency preserving or trivial, and E-relations. Essentially they are different ways of describing the same thing, and so an operation for changing one automatically gives us an operation for changing the other. This observation is at the heart of the present paper. Given U ∈ Υ we shall denote by U the E-relation defined from |∼ U via (1) above. Since we have already seen that rational consequence relations which are either consistency preserving or trivial are characterised by the sequences in Υ, Proposition 2 leads us to the following result.
Proposition 3 Let be a binary relation on L. Then
is an E-relation iff = U for some U ∈ Υ.
Note again that U = V does not imply U = V. Also note that U will be absurd iff U is empty. It is straightforward to prove the following.
Revision of E-relations
Nayak (Nayak 1994) deviates from the basic AGM framework in two ways. Firstly, in order to help us deal with iterated revision (see (Boutilier 1996; Darwiche & Pearl 1997; Williams 1994) ), he argues that we need not only a description of the new belief set which results from a revision, but also a new E-relation which can then guide any further revision. Thus we should enlarge our epistemic state to consist of a belief set together with an E-relation and then perform revision on this larger state. In fact, since, as we have seen, the belief set may be determined from the E-relation, we may take our epistemic states to be just E-relations.
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Secondly, he suggests that the epistemic input should consist not of a single sentence, but rather another Erelation. (See (Nayak 1994) for motivation.) He claims it is then possible, in his framework, to capture the revision of E-relations by arbitrary sets of sentences E by first converting the set E into a suitable E-relation E and then revising by E . We shall discuss this point further in the next section. In this section we shall use the characterisation of E-relations given in Proposition 3 to describe Nayak's proposal of how one E-relation should be revised by another to obtain a new E-relation. The ideas behind this formulation can also be seen in (Nayak 1994). Let K be the prior E-relation and let E be the input E-relation. By Proposition 3, we know that there exist U, V ∈ Υ such that K = U and E = V . Hence we may reduce the question of entrenchment revision to a question of how to revise one sequence of world-sets by another. More precisely, we can define a sequence revision function * : Υ × Υ → Υ, where U * V is the result of revising U by V, and then simply lift this to an entrenchment revision function by setting
(The context will always make it clear whether we are considering * as an operation on sequences or an operation on E-relations.) All this must be independent of precisely which U and V are chosen to represent K and E respectively. The definition for the sequence revision function * which we choose, motivated purely in order to arrive at Nayak's entrenchment revision function, is the following:
6 In this context of iterated revision, the consideration of more comprehensive epistemic states of which a belief set is but one component has also been suggested in (Darwiche & Pearl 1997 ) and .
Definition 3
We define the function * : Υ×Υ → Υ by setting , for all U = (U 0 , . . . , U k ) and V = (V 0 , . . . , V m ),
Clearly it is the case that U * V is always full, unless V is empty, in which case so is U * V. Hence we certainly have U * V ∈ Υ. The following proposition assures us that * , when lifted to an operation on E-relations, is well-defined.
From now on we will follow Nayak and use K * E as an abbreviation for K * E . The authors of (Nayak, Nelson, & Polansky 1996) propose the following postulates for the revision of E-relations:
If both θ E φ and φ E θ and if, for all λ, χ such that θ ∧ φ |= χ and θ ≺ χ, we have
We refer the reader to (Nayak, Nelson, & Polansky 1996) for the justification of these postulates. Any operation of revision of E-relations which satisfies the above three conditions is called a well-behaved entrenchment revision operation in (Nayak, Nelson, & Polansky 1996) , where it is shown that there is, in fact, precisely one well-behaved entrenchment revision operation, namely the one given in (Nayak 1994). Thus the above three postulates serve to characterise Nayak's revision method. Our revision operation, defined by Definition 3 via (2) above, also satisfies (E1 * )-(E3 * ) and hence is semantically equivalent to the operation constructed in (Nayak 1994).
Theorem 1 If we set
One advantage of this particular formulation is that it is relatively easy to show properties of the wellbehaved entrenchment revision operation * . For example, the following proposition regarding sequence revision is straightforward to prove. Proposition 6 Let U, V, W ∈ Υ and suppose V is not empty. Then ( U * V) * W = U * ( V * W). This proposition, in turn, gives us the following interesting associativity property of the induced entrenchment revision operation. Proposition 7 Let i be an E-relation for i = 1, 2, 3. Then, if 2 is not absurd, we have ( 1 * 2 ) * 3 = 1 * ( 2 * 3 ).
Generating E-relations from Sets of Sentences
As we said in the last section, Nayak proposes that his way of revising one E-relation by another allows a way of modelling the revision of an E-relation by a set of sentences E by first converting, according to some suitable method, the set E into an E-relation E and then revising by E . The question of which "suitable method" we should use for generating E is clearly an interesting question in itself. A strong feeling is that the relation E should adequately convey the informational content of E, but what does this mean? An obvious first requirement of E would seem to be Bel( E ) = Cn(E), but there are different ways in which this can be achieved. The definition which Nayak seems to advocate is the following, based on an idea in (Rott 1992a) , and expressed via its strict part.
The clause "E |= ⊥" in the above merely ensures that if E is inconsistent then E is absurd, while the clause " |= θ" ensures that tautologies are maximally entrenched. The main body of the definition essentially says that φ should be strictly more entrenched than θ iff each ⊆-maximal subset of E which fails to imply φ may be strictly enlarged to a subset of E which fails to imply θ. The problem with defining E in this way is that it will fail, in general, to be an E-relation. In particular it will not necessarily satisfy (E1).
7 How can we modify/extend it so as to obtain an E-relation? The possibility we choose is to compare the sets which fail to imply θ and φ by cardinality rather than inclusion:
Note that this definition does indeed extend the "old" definition given above. That E defined by Definition 4 is a genuine E-relation will follow once we have found a sequence U ∈ Υ such that E = U . We do this as follows. Let us assume for simplicity that E is finite with |E| = k. Then, for each i = 0, . . . , k, we set
7 It should be noted, however, that E so defined does still enjoy several interesting properties. In fact it belongs to Rott's family of generalized E-relations (Rott 1992b) .
8 Possibilities in this spirit are also discussed in (Benferhat et al. 1993 ) (Section 2) and (Lehmann 1995) (Section 8). See also the closely related Section 5 of (Freund 1999) .
So, in the principal case when E is consistent, U E i contains those worlds which satisfy precisely k − i elements of
E is full (and so, either way, U E ∈ Υ). In both cases we have E = U E . Hence E is an Erelation. Note that, with this notation, we have U ∅ = (W ). Hence we can think of ∅ as being the initial epistemic state in which each world is equally plausible.
How does E portray the informational content of E? The sequence U E shows us clearly. First of all it is easy to see that E satisfies the basic requirement of Bel( E ) = Cn(E) (in particular the only sentences believed in ∅ are the tautologies) since the most plausible worlds in U E , i.e., the worlds in U E 0 , are precisely those worlds which satisfy every sentence in E. The big question is how does U E classify the worlds which do not satisfy every sentence in E? The answer is that it considers one such world more plausible than another iff it satisfies strictly more sentences in E. This makes the relation E dependent on the syntactic form, not just the semantic form, of E, i.e., we can have Cn(E 1 ) = Cn(E 2 ) without necessarily having E1 = E2 . One situation where this method might be deemed suitable is if we want to regard the elements of E as items of information coming from different, independent sources.
From now on, for the special case when E is a singleton, we shall write θ rather than {θ} etc. We have the following partial generalisation of Proposition 4.
Proposition 9 Let U ∈ Υ be full and let θ, φ ∈ L. Then φ ∈ Bel( U * θ ) iff θ |∼ U φ.
We are now ready to give the sequence U such that θ |∼ U φ iff θ |∼ ∆ lex φ. Let (∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ n ) be the Zpartition of ∆. Then, to obtain our special U we start at the sequence (W ) and then successively revise, using our sequence revision function * , by U ∆ → i for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Recalling that (W ) = U ∅ we may give our main result. Recall that we are assuming ∆ is finite and that ∆ → is consistent.
Theorem 2 Let ∆ be a set of defaults with associated
φ. Note that, by Proposition 6 and the assumption that ∆ → is consistent, the term U ∅ * U
is independent of the bracketing. Similar remarks apply (using Proposition 7) to the next result. Using Propositions 8 and 9 we may re-express Theorem 2 as: Corollary 1 Let ∆ be a set of defaults with associated
If we go further and actually identify a revision of the form * E with * E then we have the following characterisation of the lexicographic closure.
Corollary 2 Let ∆ be a set of defaults with associated
Hence, using this particular method of revision and this particular way of interpreting revision by a set of sentences, we have shown that θ |∼ ∆ lex φ iff φ is believed after first successively revising the initial epistemic state by the set of sentences ∆ → i for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, and then revising by θ.
Further Work
The developments in the previous sections have raised a couple of questions regarding both belief revision and default entailment. Firstly, while there have been several papers published concerned with iterated revision by single sentences, and also some concerned with revision by sets of sentences, 9 there seems to be little in the way of any systematic study of iterated revision by sets of sentences.
10 Darwiche and Pearl (Darwiche & Pearl 1997 ) provide a postulational approach to the question of iterated revision of epistemic states by single sentences. In this approach they take the concept of epistemic state to be primitive, assuming only that from each such state Ψ we may extract a belief set (in the usual AGM sense of the term) B(Ψ) representing the set of sentences accepted in that state. For example Darwiche and Pearl's second postulate may be stated as
(For the other postulates and their justifications see (Darwiche & Pearl 1997) .) It is not difficult to see that, if we identify epistemic state here with E-relation and take B( ) = Bel( ), then the method proposed by Nayak, on its restriction to single sentences 11 satisfies all of Darwiche and Pearl's postulates. However, it also satisfies some interesting properties in the general case. For example, given an E-relation and E 1 ⊆ E 2 ⊆ L such that E 2 is consistent, we have ( * E 2 ) * E 1 = ( * E 2 − E 1 ) * E 1 . In particular, if {θ, φ} is consistent, we have ( * {θ, φ}) * φ = ( * θ) * φ. (Note this is a stronger statement than just Bel(( * {θ, φ}) * φ) = Bel(( * θ) * φ).) The question of whether this, or any other, property of iterated revision by sets is desirable seems to be a question worth investigating. Another question is: Can we, by modifying the various parameters involved in this revision process, model any of the other existing methods of default entailment, apart from the lexicographic closure, or even construct new ones? For example, given our set of defaults ∆ and its Z-partition (∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ n ), let Θ i = i≤j ∆ j for each i = 1, . . . , n. Then, by the above comments, we may rewrite Corollary 2 as θ |∼ ∆ lex φ iff φ ∈ Bel( ∅ * Θ → 0 * · · · * Θ → n * θ). We conjecture that if we now replace each Θ → i in the above by Θ → i (i.e., the conjunction, in some order, of the sentences in Θ → i ), then we obtain the rational closure (Lehmann & Magidor 1992) (which is semantically equivalent to System Z (Pearl 1990 )) of ∆, instead of the lexicographic closure. This and other variations are the subject of ongoing study. Finally, note that, since we assumed at the outset that our language L is based on only finitely many propositional variables, and also that ∆ is a finite set of defaults, we have not needed in this paper to confront the question of revision by infinite sets of sentences. It remains to be seen to what extent the ideas in this paper can be extended to cover this more general situation.
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Conclusion
In this paper we have taken a particular model of default reasoning -the lexicographic closure -and re-cast it in terms of iterated belief revision by sets of sentences, using the particular, independently motivated, revision model of Nayak. In the process of doing this, a couple of interesting avenues for further exploration have suggested themselves. In particular, the questions of which properties of iterated multiple revision should be deemed desirable, and of how we may apply the principles underlying the AGM theory of belief revision in the context of default reasoning.
